ABSTRACT Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is now widely adopted in modern operating systems to thwart code reuse attacks. However, an adversary can still bypass fine-grained ASLR by exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities and performing memory disclosure attacks. Although Execute-no-Read schemes have been proven to be an efficient solution against read-based memory disclosures, existing solutions need modifications to kernel or hypervisor. Besides, the defense of execution-based memory disclosures has been ignored. In this paper, we propose BoundShield, a self-protection scheme that provides comprehensive protection against memory disclosure attacks, especially against those based on executing arbitrary code by leveraging Intel Memory Protection Extension. BoundShield protects code memory by defending not only read-based memory disclosure attacks but also execution-based memory disclosure attacks. On one hand, read-based memory disclosures can be eliminated by hiding all code sections and code pointers in a secret region separated from the user address space. On the other hand, BoundShield prevents return addresses from being corrupted and ensures that all function pointers point to the legitimate entries whenever they are dereferenced, which significantly reduces the attack surface for execution-based memory disclosures. We have implemented a prototype of BoundShield based on a set of modifications to compiler toolchain and the standard C library. Our evaluation results show that the BoundShield can provide strong defenses against memory disclosure attacks while incurring a small performance overhead.
However, it has been shown that this assumption is easily broken down by advanced attacks, which can probe these safe regions with ingenious methods [12] , [13] . A more rigorous approach to mitigate memory disclosure attacks is to apply Execute-no-Read (XnR) system [9] [10] [11] . The main idea of XnR solutions is to prevent attackers from reading code pages. Typically, such solutions rely on modifications to operating system kernel or virtual machine hypervisors and aim to mark code pages execute-only. Recent solutions also protect code pointers to stop indirect memory disclosures [9] , [10] , in which attackers infer the locations of gadgets from leaked code pointers in memory. However, static data pointers (i.e., pointers to data sections) can also leak out information of code sections, since code sections are placed with fixed offsets from data sections. Additionally, XnR solutions mainly focus on defending read-based memory disclosure attacks [4] , leaving programs still vulnerable to execution-based memory disclosure attacks [5] , [6] .
In this paper, we present BoundShield, a practical system providing comprehensive protection against memory disclosure attacks, especially against those based on executing arbitrary code. The key design of BoundShield is to divide the user address space into two regions with a Software Fault Isolation (SFI)-based mechanism, and use the secret region to hide code sections and code pointers in the memory. BoundShield prevents illegal memory accesses into the secret region by leveraging Intel Memory Protection Extension (MPX) to provide strong access isolation for the two regions. In details, BoundShield stops read-based memory disclosures by hiding all code sections and code pointers in the secret region. Meanwhile, BoundShield stops execution-based memory disclosures by preventing return addresses from being corrupted and checking whether function pointers point to legitimate entries when they are dereferenced. In this way, not only attacks based on reading code pages or pointers but also those based on executing arbitrary code can be prevented.
Our prototype implementation of BoundShield consists of two components: a compile-time component as a custom compiler toolchain, and a runtime component modified from the standard C library. The compile-time component is responsible for instrumenting and transforming the input program. The runtime component is in charge of setting up the memory layout and initializing runtime environment.
Our evaluation results demonstrate that BoundShield can provide a strong defense against memory disclosure attacks, and can be adopted to real-world server programs such as nginx and lighttpd. BoundShield only incurs minor overhead, in details, 5.8% slowdown for SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks on average. Moreover, BoundShield does not require any OSlevel or hypervisor-level modifications and can be readily adopted to defend more complex attacks.
In summary, our contributions are listed as follows: 1) We have studied existing solutions on preventing memory disclosure attacks and figure out that they either provide incomplete protection or require modifications to the original operating system.
2) We present BoundShield, a practical approach providing comprehensive protection against both read-based and execution-based memory disclosure attacks without requiring any modifications to the original operating system. 3) We have implemented a prototype system of BoundShield based on a custom compiler toolchain and the standard C library with a set of modifications. Our evaluation results demonstrate that BoundShield provides a reliable defense against memory disclosure attacks, and incurs a minor performance overhead on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and server programs.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
This section first introduces preliminary knowledge about memory disclosure attacks and the Intel MPX. Then, related works about prevention methods against memory disclosure attacks are presented.
A. MEMORY DISCLOSURE ATTACKS
The ultimate goal of code reuse attacks is to hijack the control flow of an application and perform malicious behaviors with existing code [14] . One most common technique of code reuse attacks is Return-oriented programming (ROP) [2] , which chains instruction sequences with a return instruction (gadgets) together to perform arbitrary operations. To successfully launch such attacks, the adversary must identify the useful gadgets in the application and shared libraries in advance. ASLR is currently deployed in modern operating systems to prevent attackers from probing memory layout information. It randomizes the base addresses of modules, forcing attackers to guess the locations of gadgets. However, an adversary can still bypass ASLR by exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities to locate valuable gadgets on-the-fly. We discuss the methods that an attacker may use to find gadgets as follows:
1) READ-BASED MEMORY DISCLOSURES
Armed with an arbitrary memory read primitive, an adversary can either read from code pages to collect gadgets [13] , or harvest enough code pointers in data regions to infer the locations of gadgets without directly reading code pages [15] . Additionally, the adversary can also use static data pointers to infer the code layout, as code sections have fixed offsets with data sections. The prerequisite for these attacks is the ability to read from any memory regions, which allows the attacker to retrieve enough information about code layout.
2) EXECUTION-BASED MEMORY DISCLOSURES
These methods identify gadgets by diverting a control transfer to an arbitrary address and measuring program behaviors to infer which codes have been executed. Such attacks can be applied to crash-tolerant applications such as server programs. Seibert et al. [6] overwrite a function pointer to different addresses within a function, and measure the execution time to identify different functions. Blind ROP [5] overwrites return addresses to arbitrary addresses and probes the executed codes by observing application behaviors. The prerequisite for such attacks is the ability to overwrite a code pointer to arbitrary addresses, which allows attackers to probe any code gadgets.
B. INTEL MPX
Intel Memory Protection Extension (MPX) is proposed to provide efficient protection against memory errors and is available on Intel processors starting from Skylake microarchitecture. MPX provides four bound registers from %bnd0 to %bnd3 and a set of new instructions. The bound registers are 128-bit and used to store a 64-bit lower bound address and a 64-bit upper bound address. In an MPX protected program, once a pointer is made, its associated bounds are generated and stored in the memory. Whenever a pointer is dereferenced, the associated bounds are loaded into a bound register, and the pointer is checked by bound check instructions. Bound check instructions are used to check whether the address of a memory reference is in the legitimate range. Among them, bndcu is used to check the upper bound, while bndcl is used to check the lower bound. If the pointer exceeds the bounds stored in the bound register, a #BR fault will be triggered and caught by the exception handler. While providing most robust security guarantees against memory errors, the standard use of MPX imposes a significant runtime overhead (over 2× on SPEC benchmarks) [16] . However, previous works have shown that the vast impact on performance is mainly introduced by repeatedly loading and storing bounds rather than performing bound check instructions, which often takes little performance overhead [17] , [18] . Thus, it will be efficient to apply MPX for bound checking in our proposed BoundShield technique.
C. RELATED WORKS AGAINST MEMORY DISCLOSURE ATTACKS
Many defense schemes have been proposed to thwart memory disclosure attacks. One solution is to store sensitive data (e.g., code pointers) in a safe region, which is hidden in the large 64-bit virtual address space. These techniques are based on information hiding, which hides sensitive data rather than isolates them to reduce the performance overhead. For example, Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) [8] separates all code pointers from other data, and stores them in the safe region. To restrict memory accesses to the safe region, CPI ensures that addresses pointing to the safe region are never stored in memory. Hence, the adversary can neither locate code pointers nor corrupt them to divert control flows.
ASLR-Guard [7] shares a similar design but exploits two safe regions to encrypt function pointers and hide return addresses respectively. Since all code pointers are encoded or separated from regular memory space, the adversary cannot locate gadgets through code pointers. Although information hiding based solutions seem to be promising, recent attacks have shown that information hiding is, actually, a weak isolation model, since sensitive data are not truly isolated. An adversary can probe the safe regions with ingenious methods and therefore bypass the defense [12] , [13] , [19] .
A more rigorous solution is to employee Execute-noRead (XnR) system. Typically, such solutions rely on a modified OS kernel or hypervisor to mark code pages as execute-only. Backes et al. [20] proposed to manipulate the page fault handler to mark only a small window of code pages as readable during execution. Crane et al. [9] , [10] proposed Readactor and Readactor++, both of which leverage a hardware-assisted virtualization support, named as Extended Page Tables (EPT) to mark code pages as execute-only. To further prevent indirect memory disclosures, Readactor replaces all function pointers and return addresses with substitute pointers to trampolines. Thus the code pointers can only leak out the addresses of trampolines also marked as execute-only. However, Readactor does not provide a comprehensive defense. Since there are fixed offsets between code sections and data sections, an adversary can still infer the code layout with a static data pointer. Moreover, XnR systems are typically vulnerable to execution-based memory disclosures. Even if the code pointers and return addresses are replaced with substitutes, an adversary can still overwrite them to any addresses in code pages, perform an executionbased memory disclosure to reveal the code pages, and identify gadgets.
Other solutions have been proposed to mitigate memory disclosure attacks or code reuse attacks. Re-randomization solutions [21] [22] [23] repeatedly randomize the code layout during program execution, leaving little probability for attackers to reuse a gadget. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions [24] [25] [26] mitigate code reuse attacks by analyzing the targets of indirect branches and checking whether code pointers are in the legitimate set during execution.
III. THE DESIGN OF BoundShield
In this section, we first define the threat model of our defense. Then we give an overview of BoundShield, and describe it in detail.
A. THREAT MODEL
Our defense against memory disclosure attacks is based on a practical threat model. The assumptions are as follows:
1) The target system is configured with W⊕X, which is supported by modern operating systems. 2) We assume that the hardware and the operating system are in the trusted computing base. In this paper, we focus on preventing adversaries from learning about the memory layout and searching gadgets while kernel attacks, hardware attacks, and data-only attacks are out of scope. 3) We assume that the attackers cannot tamper with our implementation of BoundShield. 4) The adversary can read from or write to arbitrary memory addresses repeatedly by exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities. Thus, the attacks can happen within a read-based memory disclosure by reading from memory explicitly or within an execution-based memory disclosure by overwriting code pointers and diverting control transfers to arbitrary addresses.
B. OVERVIEW OF BoundShield
To provide comprehensive protection against memory disclosure attacks, we need to: 1) prevent attackers from reading code and code pointers and 2) prevent attackers from executing arbitrary code by overwriting code pointers. Figure 1 illustrates the overview of BoundShield. BoundShield takes program's source codes as input and makes a series of transformations on the program at compile-time and runtime. At compile time, our custom compiler transforms the code to support the secret region and hide function pointers, while the assembler transforms the code to hide return addresses. At runtime, we use a modified dynamic linker to hide code sections and set up the environment. During execution, the protected programs will be shielded from memory disclosure attacks. The brief introduction of each transformation in BoundShield is listed as follows: 1) Secret region. Since information hiding has been proven to be unreliable, we apply a strong SFI scheme to protect critical parts of the memory. Specifically, BoundShield divides the user address space into two regions: one secret region to store code and code pointers, and one regular region for the rest. We provide substantial isolation by checking load and store instructions with MPX, which forbids an adversary reading from or writing to the secret region. 2) Hiding code sections. As attackers may read directly from the code pages and locate gadgets, BoundShield separates code sections from data sections, and relocates all code sections into the secret region. Hence, all code pages are execute-only. Besides, as we break the fixed offsets between code sections and data sections, an adversary can be prevented from inferring code layout with static data pointers. 3) Hiding function pointers. Code pointers are critical parts in the memory, as attackers can exploit them to perform both read-based and execution-based memory disclosures. To protect function pointers, BoundShield first replaces all function pointers with pointers to trampolines hidden in the secret region so that they can only leak the addresses of trampolines, but not the addresses of original code. To further thwart execution-based memory disclosures, we ensure all function pointers point to trampoline entries when dereferenced, which significantly reduces the attack surface. 4) Hiding return addresses. Return address is another kind of code pointers. To protect return addresses, BoundShield maintains a hidden stack placed in the secret region. All return addresses are stored on the hidden stack so that attackers cannot read, or overwrite them. This strategy eliminates both read-based memory disclosures and execution-based memory disclosures which exploit return addresses.
C. SECRET REGION
Rather than relying on information hiding, BoundShield creates a secret region to hide sensitive parts (e.g., code and code pointers) in the program. We divide the large user address space into two regions: the secret region which occupies the lower part of the address space and the regular region which occupies the higher part. To provide effective isolation, BoundShield prevents any memory accesses into the secret region. In practice, we preserve the boundary of the secret region in the lower bound of MPX bound register %bnd0, and insert bndcl instructions before load and store instructions in the application. Figure 2 shows an example of BoundShield's instrumentation for memory accesses. Note that all load and store instructions are checked against the same boundary, so that there is no need to change %bnd0 during execution. We also propose some optimizations to reduce the number of inserted instructions, which will be discussed in Section III-G. BoundShield further leverages the secret region to hide critical parts of the program. All regular data in the stack, heap, and data sections are placed in the regular region. Code sections, trampolines, and the hidden stack are hidden in the secret region, generating immunity to the malicious read or write operations. Figure 3 shows the runtime memory layout for BoundShield applications. The metadata records the base address and the size of each memory area in the secret region, and is only accessed by BoundShield's runtime code. We use the metadata to manage the memory allocation in the secret region and help BoundShield hide code and code pointers. We set %bnd0 during the program initialization. At execution time, if the address of a memory reference is below the lower bound of %bnd0, a #BR fault will be triggered. Unlike previous SFI schemes [27] , [28] , BoundShield has no limitation on boundary locations. By simply changing the value in %bnd0, the size of the secret region can be freely set on demand.
D. HIDING CODE SECTIONS
Armed with an arbitrary read primitive, an adversary can directly read code pages and gather gadgets. Executeonly memory indeed prevents code pages from being read. However, current operating systems do not natively support this feature. Rather than relying on modifications to kernel or hypervisor similar to previous work [9] [10] [11] , BoundShield enforces an execute-only memory by hiding all code sections in the secret region.
In x86-64 architecture, programs and libraries are compiled as position-independent executables so that they can be loaded at any addresses in memory and can benefit from ASLR. Accesses to static data in data sections are typically using PC-relative instructions, which are hardcoded with fixed offsets. To hide code sections, BoundShield separates code sections from data sections while ensuring all accesses to static data behave as usual. During link time, we record the positions of all PC-relative instructions that should be fixed and append this patching information to the executables. At load time, BoundShield initially relocates all code sections to random addresses in the secret region by calling mmap(), and then fix the offsets in PC-relative instructions according to the patching information. As shown in Figure 3 , all code sections are hidden in the secret region during execution and protected by the isolation mechanism. Note that another benefit of hiding code sections is that the fixed offsets between code sections and data sections can be broken so that adversaries cannot infer the code layout with a static data pointer.
E. HIDING FUNCTION POINTERS
Hiding code sections only stops attackers from directly reading the code. If code pointers are left unprotected in the regular memory region, an attacker can 1) read from memory and harvest code pointers to infer gadget locations with prior knowledge of code layout; 2) overwrite code pointers to execute arbitrary code and probe codes that have been executed.
One way to protect function pointers is to replace them with substitutes (e.g., pointers to trampolines) [9] , [10] . Each trampoline entry contains a small piece of code, which directly jumps to the entry of the corresponding function. This strategy successfully stops read-based memory disclosures, since function pointers can only leak out trampoline addresses. However, the solution is vulnerable to execution-based memory disclosures, as attackers are still able to overwrite trampoline pointers to arbitrary addresses and execute any code in code sections. Our design shares a similar idea with previous trampolinebased solutions, as shown in Figure 4 . We generate trampoline entries for functions the addresses of which have been taken and replace all function pointers in the regular region with corresponding trampoline pointers. We put all trampoline entries into a trampoline section, which is hidden in the secret region during runtime, so that real function pointers can be hidden within the trampolines and leaked function pointers can only reveal trampoline addresses. Different from previous solutions, we further thwart execution-based memory disclosures by only allowing function pointers to point to trampoline entries, which can significantly reduce the attack surface. At load time, we perform a further relocation as mentioned in III-D for trampoline sections and place them at lower addresses than other code sections in the memory. The boundary between code sections and trampoline sections is stored in the upper bound of an MPX register, i.e., the value of %bnd1. For each indirect call to functions, we insert a bndcu instruction to check against %bnd1. If the address in a function pointer is higher than the boundary, a fault will be triggered. We further insert an and instruction to ensure an VOLUME 6, 2018 8-byte aligned trampoline entry is pointed but not the middle of a trampoline instruction.
Our strategies can reduce the attack surface for executionbased memory disclosure attacks significantly because of two reasons. First, attackers can only probe trampoline entries, but not the gadgets in the whole code sections. Second, blindly guessing trampoline entries will probably trigger a trap, which further limits the targets to leaked trampoline pointers in the regular region.
Jump tables are used to optimize the switch/case in the program. Each entry in a jump table contains an offset from the jump table to a basic block. Normally, jump tables are stored in .rodata. To prevent attackers from inferring code layout with jump table entries, we modify the compiler to emit all jump tables into code sections, and never save the addresses of jump tables or the addresses obtained from jump tables to the memory. During compilation, we identify load instructions of jump tables and do not insert checks before them. Such instructions typically use the base address of a jump table and a scaled index to access the jump table entries. As the base address is derived with a PC-relative instruction, and the scaled index is already checked in the code sequence, such instructions can only access the corresponding jump tables. Besides, the contents that these instructions read are never stored into memory. Thus, it will not bring any risk to remove checks for these instructions.
Nowadays, most programs are dynamically linked against shared libraries that are compiled as position-independent and can be loaded at any addresses in the memory. Programs use two data structures to support dynamic linking: procedure linkage table (PLT) and global offset table (GOT). Each entry in PLT is a small piece of code, which will read the address in the related GOT entry and indirectly jump to it. Calls to external functions are presented as calls to related PLT entries. During execution, the dynamic linker will resolve the addresses of external functions, and fill them into GOT so that calls to external functions work properly. As GOT contains code pointers and may leak out code layout, we configure the dynamic linker to resolve all external function addresses at load time and replace each entry in PLT with a direct jump to the external function rather than store the address of the external function in GOT. We also consider a special case in which libraries are loaded during execution by using dlopen() so that external function addresses can be obtained by using dlsym(). To cover this case, BoundShield generates a new trampoline entry for the resolved function, and return the trampoline's address rather than the original address in dlsym().
F. HIDING RETURN ADDRESSES
Attackers can also exploit another source of code pointers, return addresses, to perform memory disclosure attacks. Comparing with function pointers, return addresses are used more frequently during execution. If the trampoline-based mechanism is applied to protect return addresses, we need to generate a trampoline for each call site in the program, which would impose non-trivial performance overhead and substantially increase the attack surface for execution-based memory disclosures. For these reasons, we choose an alternative method: to store all return addresses on a hidden stack in the secret region. Commonly, the return addresses are only used with paired call/ret instructions and are not read or written by other instructions. Inspired by ASLR-Guard [7] and CPI [13] , we separate the original stack into two stacks during execution: one hidden stack that stores all return addresses and one regular stack that stores regular data. Figure 5 illustrates our method for hiding return addresses. The hidden stack uses %rsp as the stack pointer, so that call and ret work as usual. We use a dedicated register, %r15, to serve as the stack pointer of the regular stack. All other data, such as local variables, function parameters, and spilled registers, are stored on the regular stack and accessed through %r15. Special instructions such as push, pop, enter, and leave are replaced by using equivalent mov instructions.
One significant difference between BoundShield and ASLR-Guard is that we provide substantial isolation for the hidden stack rather than rely on information hiding. In practice, we use the original stack as the regular stack and allocate a memory region which is as large as the default size of the stack for the hidden stack at a random address in the secret region. As all load/store instructions are forbidden to access the secret region, it is impossible for attackers to read or overwrite any return addresses. Furthermore, to support multi-threaded processes, we modify the thread library to allocate a hidden stack at thread create and destroy it at thread exit.
We also notice a special use of return addresses that setjmp() takes the return address of current call site from the stack, and passes it to the paired longjmp(). This will return to the call site of setjmp() rather than its own call site. For this rare case, we allow setjmp() and longjmp() to access the return address with %rsp. To further protect the return address, we encrypt it with a XOR instruction in setjmp(), and decrypt it in longjmp(). The key is determined at runtime and is never leaked to the regular region.
G. OPTIMIZATIONS
An initial implementation of BoundShield would check all load and store instructions in the program. Noticing that checks for load/store instructions are not always necessary [17] , we perform several optimizations to further improve the efficiency of BoundShield.
1) MERGING DUPLICATE CHECKS
Load/store instructions in code sequences may use the same registers with different displacements [29] . Checks of such instructions can be merged by checking against the minimal displacement under two conditions. One condition is that two load/store instructions use the same base register and the same scaled index register if used. The other condition is that the value in the register(s) is not changed or spilled to memory in all paths between these two instructions. Figure 6 presents an example of merging duplicate checks. We first merge the duplicate checks in each basic block and then analyze the control flow graph to further eliminate duplicate checks among basic blocks in each function. 
2) STACK CHECKS
In BoundShield, normal stack data are stored on the regular stack, which uses %r15 as its stack pointer. Load and store instructions will use %r15 as the base register to access the regular stack. In x86-64 architecture, the displacement of instructions is limited to 32-bit. By setting the regular stack at an appropriate address in the regular region, we can make sure that an instruction which only uses %r15 and the displacement can never reach the secret region. However, it is possible for attackers to pivot %r15 near or into the secret region and exploit the unchecked stack load/store instructions. We eliminate this minor possibility by 1) allocating guard pages above the secret region so that repeatedly minus %r15 will eventually trigger a fault; 2) checking %r15 after instructions that write an absolute value or register into the %r15 so that exploiting such instructions will trigger a fault. Therefore, we just need to instrument stack load/store instructions which use both %r15 and a scaled index register, thus eliminating unnecessary checks on stack operations.
3) PC-RELATIVE CHECKS
As we mentioned in III-D, accesses to static data in positionindependent executables typically use PC-relative instructions. These instructions can have two patterns, both of which use PC register (%rip) explicitly or implicitly. The first pattern directly uses %rip as the base register and add an offset to decide the effective address of load/store instructions, such as mov 0x20b808(%rip),%rax. Another pattern is usually used to access fields in a data structure; it is a small code sequence which first loads the effective address of the static variable into a register and then loads from or stores to memory by using the register as the base register, such as lea 0x20d36a(%rip),%rbx; mov (%rbx),%rdx. As the offsets are hardcoded, attackers cannot modify the effective address of load/store instructions in both patterns. For this reason, we can avoid checking these instructions for better performance.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to verify the effectiveness of BoundShield on defending memory disclosure attacks, we have built a prototype on the Linux 64-bit 4.4.0 kernel. BoundShield has two main components: compile-time component and runtime component. The first component is made up of a set of modifications to GNU toolchain and is responsible for code transformations in applications. The second component is built on the standard C library, glibc, which is in charge of transforming the memory layout and initializing environment at runtime. To further clarify the working process of our implementation and show detailed information of the transformed program memory layout, an example using a simple demo program has been demonstrated in Appendix.
A. COMPILE-TIME COMPONENT
Our compile-time component has four main tasks: 1) instrumenting load/store instructions to provide substantial isolation for the secret region; 2) adopting trampoline mechanism and instrumenting indirect calls to hide function pointers; 3) replacing the usage of %rsp with %r15 to hide return addresses; 4) generating patching information for instructions that need to be fixed at runtime.
We first modify GCC-4.8.4 to instrument load/store instructions and adopt trampoline mechanism. We add two extra passes in register transform language optimization phase. The first pass initially generates trampolines for functions the addresses of which have been taken, and inserts check instructions before indirect calls. Then, function symbols in address taking instructions and data sections are replaced to ensure that all function pointers can be replaced with trampoline pointers during runtime. The second pass follows after the first one. Load and store instructions in programs are scanned, and instrumentation related to the proposed optimizations are performed.
The transformation of the hidden stack is performed by the cooperation between compiler and assembler. We first configure GCC to reserve %r15, reduce the usage of push/pop and emit code as if there is no return address on the regular stack. Then we use a modified assembler which is implemented based on open source code of ASLR-guard [7] to replace all usage of %rsp with %r15.
For special stack instructions such as push, pop, enter, and leave, we replace them with equivalent mov instructions.
At last, we rely on a static linker to generate patching information for instructions that need to be fixed at runtime. Particularly, we consider three kinds of instructions: 1) PC-relative instructions to access static data; 2) direct jump instructions in trampolines; 3) instructions to take the address of a trampoline entry. We append the patching information to the binary to help the dynamic linker fix intructions at runtime.
B. RUNTIME COMPONENT
The runtime component of BoundShield is implemented on glibc-2.19. For dynamically linked programs, Linux kernel first loads the main executable and the dynamic linker, then controls the dynamic linker to load all shared libraries. We use custom linker scripts to decide the initial base addresses of the main executable and the dynamic linker so that the kernel can load them at appropriate addresses. The initial base addresses of shared libraries are decided by the dynamic linker.
One task of the dynamic linker is to set up the hidden stack at the beginning of the execution. In _dl_start(), we allocate a new memory area in the secret region to serve as the hidden stack. Then, we copy the current return address (the address of _dl_start_user(), which will be adjusted to the relocated dynamic linker's code later) to the hidden stack, and point %rsp to the start of the hidden stack. In this step, BoundShield also allocates memory for the metadata, which records the address and the size of each memory area in the secret region.
Another task of the dynamic linker is relocating code sections and trampolines to random addresses in the secret region. Four steps are involved to achieve this objective. First, all code sections in the main executable and shared libraries are separated from data sections by relocating them to random addresses in the secret region. Second, trampolines are further relocated to lower addresses, and the layout of them is randomized. Third, the instructions in code sections and trampolines are fixed according to the patching information generated by the static linker. Finally, the function pointers in data sections are adjusted to point to the relocated trampoline entries. There may be some corner cases that a function pointer holds the address of an original function. In these cases, BoundShield will generate a new trampoline entry and replace the function pointer with the new trampoline pointer. Function pointers in GOT are handled specially. For GOT entries, we configure the dynamic linker to resolve them at load time, and modify the corresponding PLT entries rather than GOT entries. In this process, the dynamic linker is the first module to be relocated. After that, the control is delivered to the relocated code of the dynamic linker. The code sections of the main executable and shared libraries are relocated afterward. Once relocation is finished, the original code pages are unmapped.
By default, the kernel allocated memory (e.g., stack and heap) are placed above the initial base address of the main executable in the user memory space, which resides in the regular region. If they are located in the secret region, BoundShield can reallocate a corresponding memory in the regular region. To further ensure that the regular data always reside in the regular region, we wrap mmap() to only allow BoundShield allocate memory in the secret region.
The runtime component can be launched before main() by first setting the values of %bnd0 and %bnd1 according to boundaries of the secret region and trampolines, and then enabling MPX. From now on, the application is under the protection of BoundShield.
C. HANDWRITTEN ASSEMBLY
As most parts of BoundShield are implemented on compiler toolchain, handwritten assembly code may bring some compatibility problems during deployment. We manually fix some handwritten assembly code in libgcc and glibc: 1) We provide trampoline support for handwritten assembly code by modifying instructions that take addresses of functions, and adding new trampolines for functions if needed (e.g., program entry). 2) We fix execute-only conflicts in handwritten assembly code to ensure that static data and jump tables are stored in the right sections. 3) We fix the compatibility problems between handwritten assembly code and the hidden stack to make sure that stack parameters can be accessed correctly.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we first analyze the effectiveness of BoundShield in defending against memory disclosure attacks and then evaluate the performance impact of BoundShield with standard benchmarks and server programs. We perform the experiments on Ubuntu 14.04 with an Intel Core CPU i7-6700HQ @ 2.60GHz and 16GB RAM.
A. SECURITY EVALUATION 1) READ-BASED MEMORY DISCLOSURES
In read-based memory disclosures, attackers can either directly read from code pages and collect gadgets, or infer code layout with leaked code pointers and static data pointers. BoundShield relocates all code sections to random addresses in the secret region and prevents any illegal accesses to the secret region. Hence, the code pages are execute-only, and directly reading from them will trigger a #BR fault. As the fixed offsets between code sections and data sections are broken, it is unreliable to infer code layout with static data pointers. As a result, attackers can only infer code layout with leaked code pointers in memory.
To stop such attacks, BoundShield replaces function pointers with trampoline pointers and hides all return addresses in the secret region, which means that only trampoline pointers are leaked to the regular region. Hence, attackers can only reveal addresses of trampolines, but not the addresses of the original code. To measure the effectiveness to hide code pointers, we write a memory analysis tool to dump the whole memory of programs at runtime and scan the memory to find code pointers. Particularly, each 8-byte aligned word in the memory is scanned and considered as a code pointer when it points to a valid instruction. Then we apply BoundShield to two real-world server programs, nginx 1.4.0 and lighttpd 1.4.35. To simulate the attack scenario, we first use Apache benchmark [30] to issue 100,000 requests to the server programs, and then use the memory analysis tool to check whether there are any unprotected code pointers in the regular region. During the analysis, we also calculate the number of gadgets (i.e., the total number of leaked trampoline pointers without repetition) in the regular region. Table 1 shows the results of our experiment. There is no single code pointer which points to the code in the regular region, illustrating BoundShield successfully hides code pointers. Information hiding schemes [7] , [8] are typically vulnerable to memory probing attacks [12] , [13] , [19] . These schemes store code pages and code pointers in safe regions, and relies on the large 64-bit virtual address space to hide them. However, attackers can repeatedly read from the user address space and probe the locations of safe regions. Once discover the safe regions, attackers can directly read code pages and code pointers to collect gadgets. Comparing with information hiding schemes, BoundShield provides substantial isolation for code pages and code pointers. As any read attempts from the secret region are prohibited, attackers cannot bypass BoundShield with memory probing attacks.
Previous XnR schemes [9] [10] [11] can effectively stop attackers from collecting gadgets by reading code pages and code pointers. However, attackers can still infer gadgets from static data pointers, as code sections have fixed offsets with data sections. BoundShield breaks the fixed offsets by relocating all code sections into the secret region, thus makes inferring gadgets from static data pointers unreliable. Comparing with previous XnR schemes, BoundShield provides stronger protection against read-based memory disclosure attacks.
2) EXECUTION-BASED MEMORY DISCLOSURES
Tough we have eliminated read-based memory disclosures, attackers can still conduct an execution-based memory disclosure. Normally, attackers can overwrite both function pointers and return addresses to perform execution-based memory disclosure attacks.
As for protecting return addresses, BoundShield stores all return addresses on the hidden stack placed in the secret region. As a result, attackers cannot overwrite any return addresses to probe gadgets. Meanwhile, the legitimate targets of indirect calls are limited to trampoline entries, which means even if an attacker can overwrite a function pointer, only trampoline entries can be probed, but not any gadgets in the original code sections. To measure the effectiveness of our strategy, we first calculate Average Indirect Target (AIT) metric [7] for SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. AIT measures the average number of targets that an indirect control transfer can have, which indicates the average number of targets that an attacker can probe by corrupting a code pointer. Table 2 shows the AIT metric for SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks in XnR schemes and BoundShield. XnR schemes such as Readactor [9] mainly focus on stopping read-based memory disclosures and lift no restriction on code pointers. As a result, they have the same AIT as the original programs, which means attackers can overwrite code pointers to any addresses and probe gadgets. In BoundShield, the AIT of indirect calls is limited to the number of legitimate trampoline entries. For return sites, BoundShield allows no modifications to return addresses, thus reducing the AIT to 1. On average, the targets of execution-based memory disclosures are reduced to 0.04%. Moreover, as BoundShield inserts trap entries during compilation and randomizes the trampoline layout at runtime, blindly guessing trampoline entries will probably trigger a trap, which further limits the attack surface to leaked trampoline pointers in the regular region.
We adopt BoundShield to a server program with a stack buffer overflow vulnerability, nginx 1.4.0, and use Blind ROP [5] as an example to verify the effectiveness of BoundShield in defending execution-based memory disclosure attack. The attack has three steps: 1) it first guesses the return address and the canary on the stack; 2) then it overwrites return addresses to arbitrary addresses and locates potential gadgets in the code layout; 3) finally, it builds the exploit with collected gadgets. In theory, BoundShield can stop Blind ROP at both Step 1) and Step 2), thus avoiding Step 3) to happen. Since all return addresses are stored on the hidden stack instead of the regular one, attackers can neither read or overwrite them. In our experiment, we first use the Blind ROP tool [31] to attack an unprotected nginx server, and the exploit succeeds in 3 minutes. We then use the tool to attack a nginx server which is protected by BoundShield. The exploit cannot find a single return address for more than 12 hours, and we consider the attack is unrealistic.
Information hiding solutions [7] , [8] can stop executionbased memory disclosure attacks on condition that attackers cannot locate code pointers. However, as discussed in V-A.1, such solutions can be bypassed with memory probing attacks [12] , [13] , [19] . After revealing the locations of safe regions, attackers can still probe gadgets by overwriting code pointers. Existing XnR solutions [9] [10] [11] mainly focus on read-based memory disclosure attacks, leaving programs vulnerable to execution-based memory disclosure attacks. One of the most comprehensive XnR solutions, Readactor, protects code pointers by replacing them with trampoline pointers. However, attackers can still overwrite trampoline pointers and probe any gadgets in the original code pages. Moreover, trampoline-based mechanisms may introduce new gadgets, as attackers can divert control flow to the middle of a trampoline. BoundShield fixes these issues by hiding return addresses and ensuring that function pointers only point to legitimate trampoline entries. As a result, attackers can only probe and reuse leaked trampoline pointers in the regular region, which greatly reduces the attack surface for execution-based memory disclosure attacks.
3) TRAMPOLINE REUSE ATTACKS
As described in previous sections, BoundShield provides a strong defense against memory disclosure attacks. However, attackers may still try to use the leaked trampoline pointers as gadgets and perform a trampoline reuse attack. We check the residual attack surface on real-world server programs by measuring the number of gadgets in the regular region. As shown in Table 3 , the number of available gadgets to attackers in BoundShield is much smaller than the ones in CFI solutions [32] , [33] . In CFI solutions, forward-edge gadgets include all legitimate targets of indirect calls and indirect jumps, while backward-edge gadgets include all call sites. In BoundShield, targets of indirect jumps (i.e., jump table entries and GOT entries) are never leaked to the regular region. Hence, attackers can only divert indirect calls. Since the targets of indirect calls are limited to only legitimate trampoline entries, attackers can only reuse a small portion of functions with leaked trampoline pointers as forward-edge gadgets. Due to the adoption of the hidden stack, backwardedge gadgets are eliminated in BoundShield. Since attackers can only reuse trampoline pointers, we believe that such attacks can be stopped by enforcing a more strict check (e.g., type-based check) at call sites [34] in BoundShield.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the impact of BoundShield on performance with all C programs in the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and two widely-used server programs, nginx 1.4.0 and lighttpd 1.4.35. We compile all programs and libraries with our custom toolchain and take the average number of 10 runs as the result. We compare boundshield with baseline which has the same basic setting, but does not perfom any transformations during compilation. Table 4 shows the performance overhead of BoundShield on SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. The sjeng has the highest overhead of 11.6%, while mcf induces the lowest overhead of 0.3%. The average performance overhead on SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks is 5.8%. To benchmark server programs, we use Apache benchmark [30] to send requests from a client machine which is connected to the host machine through a network cable. We configure the Apache benchmark to send 100,000 requests with a concurrency of 10. Table 5 illustrates the results. In general, BoundShield incurs a small performance overhead on server programs: 4.9% on nginx and 5.9% on lighttpd. By analysis, the performance impact is mainly caused by checks of load/store instructions, as they appear more frequently than indirect calls in programs. In general, we consider this performance loss acceptable, in case that BoundShield provides comprehensive protection against memory disclosure attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of BoundShield, a practical system to provide comprehensive protection against memory disclosure attacks. BoundShield separates a secret region from virtual memory space, and hide code sections, function pointers, and return addresses in the secret region. It makes novel uses of Intel MPX to protect both load/store instructions and indirect calls. Comparing with previous solutions, BoundShield requires no OS-level and hypervisor-level modifications and can provide a more comprehensive defense. We have implemented a prototype of BoundShield, and our evaluation results demonstrate that BoundShield can defend both read-based and execution-based memory disclosure attacks while only incurring a small performance overhead.
Currently, BoundShield focuses on protecting code and code pointers in the secret region to stop memory disclosure attacks. In future work, we plan to extend BoundShield to also protect critical non-control data in the secret region. In this way, BoundShield can stop other attack vectors, such as dataoriented attacks [35] .
APPENDIX EXAMPLE OF HOW BOUNDSHIELD WORKS
In this section, we take a simple demo program as an example to show the working process of BoundShield. The source code of the demo program is shown in Figure 7 . Normally, it will output the address of demo(), a literal string, and the code content at the address of demo(). We compile and run the program with BoundShield. As shown in Figure 8 , at compile time, BoundShield makes a series of transformations on the program with the custom compiler, assembler, and static linker. The initial base address of the program is decided by a linker script. During compilation, BoundShield also specifies the dynamic linker for the program. When executed, the program outputs the address of the corresponding trampoline of demo() and a literal string, then it crashes. With BoundShield adopted, all function pointers are replaced with trampoline pointers, so the demo program outputs the address of the corresponding trampoline rather than the address of demo(). Since all code sections are relocated into the secret region at runtime, reading from code pages will indeed trigger a #BR fault. By default, the #BR fault handler will terminate the program, which makes the demo program crash.
To give a more detailed explanation, we use gdb to trace the demo program. At runtime, BoundShield will transform the memory layout and initialize the runtime environment. Figure 9 illustrates the user address space layout of the demo program. The lower bound of %bnd0 is set to 0x5554f0000000, and the upper bound of %bnd1 is set to 0x5554c0000000. The initial base address of each module is above the boundary of the secret region. All code sections are relocated into the secret region, while trampoline sections are relocated to lower addresses. The hidden stack starts from 0x200000000 and uses %rsp as its stack pointer. The regular stack is located at the higher end of user address space and uses %r15 as its stack pointer. Figure 10 shows how BoundShield stops the demo program from reading the code content. The load instruction mov (%rax), %rax is used to read an 8-byte word from the code page, while %rax preserves the address of the corresponding trampoline of demo(), namely 0x5554acf00940. BoundShield inserts a bndcl instruction right before the load instruction during compilation. Since the address in %rax is lower than the lower bound of %bnd0, the bndcl instruction triggers a #BR fault, and the program crashes before it can read the code content. 
